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Introduction
PIETER M. JUDSON AND TARA ZAHRA
THE AUTHORS OF THE FOLLOWING SIX ARTICLES developed their work from papers theypresented at a May 2008 symposium entitled “Sites of Indifference to Nation inHabsburg Central Europe.” Hosted by the Wirth Institute for Austrian and Central
European Studies at the University of Alberta in Edmonton in cooperation with the Herder
Institute (Marburg Germany) and the Center for Austrian Studies (University of Minnesota
in Minneapolis), the symposium gathered eighteen scholars from Europe, Canada, and the
United States. The organizers sought historians of Habsburg Central Europe and the
successor states whose work explicitly examined different sites of what they labeled
“indifference to nation,” that is, forms of popular indifference to nationalist presumptions
about personal and group identity. The participants’ work exposed the limits of nationalist
paradigms for understanding popular practices of identity in daily life in the period 1848–
1948 from highly diverse perspectives. It shared an interest in investigating the complex ways
people, families, and communities may have used the language of nation ﬂexibly and indeed
opportunistically on occasion to pursue personal or community agendas. But it also
suggested the ways in which individuals, families, and communities could reject national
labels in cases where shared intimate, emotional, or commercial relations crossed local
linguistic or alleged national boundaries. These historians’ work drew on highly diverse
geographic and chronological examples, from nineteenth-century Hungary, Transylvania,
Carniola, Styria, Trieste, and Bohemia, to interwar Czechoslovakia and Fascist Italy, to post-
World War II Yugoslavia and Italy.
The very diversity of chronological and behavioral examples introduced by the authors may
suggest that “Indifference to Nation” is far too broad a category to achieve signiﬁcant analytic
use. Nevertheless, as an answer to the far more diverse ideas and behaviors gathered under the
catchall terms “nationalism” or “nationhood,” indifference may well offer a way to rethink the
powerful inﬂuence that national(ist) narratives and categories continue to exert in the ﬁeld
today, even as it deﬁnes itself in relationship to that very set of narratives.1 Scholarly interest
in indifference to nation has grown in part out of considerable dissatisfaction with ways in
which narratives oriented to national/ist outcomes continue to inﬂuence historical narratives
1For a fuller treatment of these issues, see Tara Zahra, “Imagined Non-Communities: National Indifference as a
Category of Analysis,” Slavic Review 69 (Spring 2010): 93–119.
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of Habsburg Central Europe. This interest resulted equally from scholars’ attempts to link
investigations of local cultures more effectively to the larger historical narratives that
structure the history of Habsburg Central Europe. At the level of the neighborhood or the
village, for example, historians’ claims about a linear nationalization of the masses are often
not borne out and sometimes make little sense. Evidence of local behaviors often completely
contradicts what historians otherwise imagine to have been true from evidence they draw
from party politics or the mass media. Despite the fact that the nationalist, Fascist, and
Communist movements dramatically swept across Habsburg Central Europe in the twentieth
century, seemingly leaving little space for indifference (aside from indifference to the
suffering of others), local evidence continues to confront us with signiﬁcant examples of
indifference to nationalism, right through the mid twentieth century.2
Traditional developmental models of nationalization—even those of a constructionist
character—tended to explain the disjuncture between trends of nationalization and local
examples of its rejection in terms of the allegedly traditional character of local social
relations. Examples of rejection of nationhood, so the argument goes, can be attributed to
surviving pockets of economic and social backwardness, or “premodern” religious or regional
loyalties, and should not be seen as signiﬁcant.3 Another related explanation for the
phenomenon of indifference sees it largely as an attribute of an imagined private sphere of
domesticity in which attitudes are shaped by narrowly parochial concerns and real politics
do not intrude. The scholars who met at Edmonton rejected these understandings of
indifference—views often propagated by nationalists themselves, who portrayed nationally
indifferent populations as backward or insular. Instead, they located indifference to
nationhood or nationalism precisely in highly modern social, economic, and public
developments such as mass education, literacy, industrialization, and migration. Tara Zahra
2Several local or regional studies demonstrate this point. See Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic Survival:
Germans in Prague, 1861–1914 (Princeton, 1981); Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local
History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948 (Princeton, 2003); Petr Lozoviuk, “Ethnische Indifferenz im heutigen
Ostmitteleuropa. Ein beitrag zum Studium aktueller Macht socialer und kultureller Grenzziehungen,” in Grenzen
und Differenzen. Zur Macht sozialer und kultureller Grenzziehungen, ed. Thomas Hengartner and Johannes Most,
727–37 (Leipzig, 2006); Robert Luft, “Nationale Utraquisten in Böhmen: zur Problematik ‘nationaler
Zwischenstellungen’ am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Allemands, Juifs et Tchèques à Prague, ed. Maurice Godé,
Jacques Le Rider, François Mayer, 37–51 (Montpelier, 1996); Caitlin Murdock, Changing Places: Society, Culture,
and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870–1946 (Ann Arbor, MI, 2010); Joachim Hösler, Von Krain
zu Slowenien. Die Anfänge der nationalen Differenzierungsprozesse in Krain und der Untersteiermark von der
Aufklärung bis zur Revolution 1768 bis 1848 (Munich, 2006); Peter Vodopivec, “Die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen
Ansichten des deutschen Bürgertums in Krain vom Ende des sechziger bis zum Beginn der achtziger Jahre des 19.
Jahrhunderts,” in Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Sloweniens 1848–1941, ed. Helmut Rumpler
and Arnold Suppan, 85–119 (Vienna, 1988); Konrad Clewing, Staatlichkeit und nationale Identitätsbildung.
Dalmatien in Vormärz und Revolution (Munich, 2001); Pamela Ballinger, History in Exile: Memory and Identity at
the Borders of the Balkans (Princeton, 2003); Dominique Kirchner Reill, Nationalists Who Feared the Nation:
Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice (Stanford, 2012); Laurence Cole, ed.,
Different Paths to the Nation: Regional and National Identities in Central Europe and Italy, 1830–1870 (New York,
2007); Kate Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, MA, 2004);
James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland
(Ann Arbor, MI, 2008); Brendan Karch, “Nationalism on the Margins: Silesians Between Germany and Poland,
1848–1945” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2010); Theodora Dragostinova, Between Two Motherlands: Nationality
and Emigration among the Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900–1949 (Ithaca, 2011).
3Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge,
MA, 2006), 66–70.
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summarized her approach to the diverse phenomena that constitute indifference precisely by
highlighting their political signiﬁcance:
[My goal] is to historicize national indifference and to explore its potential as a category of analysis,
without reinscribing imagined boundaries between the public (political) sphere and the private
(apolitical) world of “everyday life,” and without evacuating non-elites from politics. Instead I
argue that tensions between nationalist aspirations and popular responses to their demands often
propelled political change and radicalization in modern East Central Europe. 4
In other words, as we argue more fully below, the very processes associated with nineteenth-
and twentieth-century forms of modernity produced much of the phenomenon we see as
indifference.
Rejections of nationalism or nationhood sometimes arose when a compelling economic,
social, or emotional logic for an individual or a family contradicted the nationalist logic
propounded by local nationalist activists or even by state law. Nationalists raised worries
about afﬁliation when it came to their perception that some people were too willing to
contract so-called “mixed marriages” or their perception that some people “fraternized”
socially with local members of an “enemy nation.” In particular, nationalists worried about
the inﬂuence of local religious practice, which they believed encouraged such fraternization
at the expense of national clarity.5 Later on, especially after 1918, rejections of nationalist
demands—or even of the basic demands of nationhood—grew out of assertions of local
interests against an increasingly powerful bureaucratic state.
The types of behavior documented by scholars that might count as forms of indifference to
nationhood or nationalism are highly diverse, as are the actors who engaged in them. They
range from multilingual Jewish traders to refugees in postwar Italy, from cosmopolitan
Bohemian aristocrats to settlers in the Italian empire, to parents who wanted a bilingual
education for their children. Clearly, it is the context in which they are practiced that lends the
actions of these subjects signiﬁcance as rejections of the demands of nationhood. Scholarly
work on indifference to nationhood or nationalism is thus largely rooted in investigations of
highly localized and often individual situations. The organizers focused on “Sites of
Indifference” (as opposed to indifference itself) as a way to bring to the foreground the critical
importance of place, context, and event for interpreting certain behaviors as indifferent to or
even as a rejection of nationalism. At the same time, these investigations also carefully
incorporated an understanding of larger national or imperial institutions, laws, administrative
structures, and histories even as they dissected local social relations in order to make sense of
particular forms of behavior. In fact, it is prior studies of imperial structures and institutions,
from the judicial courts to the census to the schools that helped to produce this relatively new
interest in indifference to nation as a category of historical analysis.
Nationalist narratives about the Habsburg monarchy often ignore the importance of imperial
structures despite several historical works in the past decades that have argued cogently for the
centrality of imperial institutions and laws to the development of particular forms of nationalist
politics. If the prior existence of the nation is the basis for the historical narrative, however, then
the institutions and laws governing the empire appear to have only a limited or temporary
meaning in the inevitable development of a national community. By placing more of an
4Zahra, “Imagined Non-Communities,” 97–98.
5Some examples of concerns about “mixed marriages,” “fraternization,” and the dangerous inﬂuence of local priests
are found in Judson, Guardians of the Nation, 33, 112–23.
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emphasis on imperial and administrative structures, however, some historians had already
effectively questioned the degree to which alleged nations as such had actually functioned as
primary agents in the history of the region. In particular, historical scholarship on the
complex relationship among language use, primary education, and the rights of citizenship
in the Habsburg monarchy traced how nationalism could have emerged in the Habsburg
monarchy as a powerful political force without relying on traditional tropes of awakening
nations, ethnic mosaics, or the nation-state as history’s logical outcome.6
As it developed within the Habsburg monarchy, nationalism increasingly made universalizing
claims on individuals and signiﬁcant demands on their personal behavior, demands that often
contradicted people’s understanding of their own interests and attachments. Especially after
1848, nationalist activists fought to instill in people a sense of the urgency of their demands,
often invoking a language of fundamental political rights to justify their programs. At the local
level, however, the experience of ﬁghting for individual rights of citizenship, such as the right
to use a local language in the schools, in the administration, and in the courts, gradually
became subordinated to the idea of promoting the embattled group. Nationalists sought to
make the rights of citizenship a function of national group identity, and they demanded
collective rights for imagined national communities. And as groups of activists succeeded in
gaining their linguistic and legal demands, they increasingly presented membership in their
national communities as mutually exclusive.
Several historians have analyzed this process by which nationalists sought to infuse local
social life with exclusionary views of national belonging.7 Some local nationalists in the
nineteenth century rejected this notion of exclusivity, asserting their ability to belong to
more than one nation in different contexts. Their protests, however, were not effective. In
the Bohemian Lands, for example, nationalist attempts to organize social life in the 1880s
resulted in the destruction of local clubs originally open to those who used either Czech or
German and subsequently ended many friendships. Historian Gerald Stourzh, for example,
offers one such account of his Moravian ancestor Franz Anderle, whose family had spoken
Czech and who had to learn German in school as a way to obtain a higher education and
eventually a career as a civil servant. Anderle lamented that the vicious politics of
nationalism had destroyed the local reading association to which he belonged and to whose
governing body he had been elected. Under suspicion of Slavic sympathies by German
nationalist members, Anderle was removed from the governing body and forced to avoid the
organization whose society he had enjoyed. “Wherever high politics is practiced,” noted
Anderle with some bitterness, “we all know that that is where genial sociability ends.”8
6King, throughout his Budweisers, argues strongly for a consideration of state institutions for understanding the
particular issues raised and strategies developed by nationalist movements both in Bohemia and in Budweis/
Budějovice. Several inﬂuential studies demonstrate the crucial role played by state institutions in shaping
nationalist movements. See esp.: Emil Brix, Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und
Assimilation. Die Sprachenstatistik in den zisleithanischen Volkszählungen 1880 bis 1910 (Vienna, 1982); Gerald
Stourzh, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs 1848–1918
(Vienna, 1985); Hannelore Burger, Sprachenrecht und Sprachengerechtigkeit im österreichischen Unterrichtswesen
1867–1918 (Vienna, 1994); Gary B. Cohen, “Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the
Habsburg Monarchy, 1867–1914,” Central European History 40 (2007): 241–78.
7King, Budweisers; Bjork, Neither German nor Pole; Judson, Guardians.
8Gerald Stourzh, “‘Aus der Mappe meines Urgrossvaters.’ Eine mährische Juristenlaufbahn im 19. Jahrhundert,” in
Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte. Ausgewählte Studien 1990–2010, ed. Gerald Stourzh, 125–38 (Vienna,
2011), esp. 134. See also examples in Jeremy King, “The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism,
Ethnicity, and Beyond,” in Staging the Past. The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to
the Present, ed. Nancy Wingﬁeld and Maria Bucur, 112–52 (West Lafayette, IN, 2001).
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If nationalists hoped to convince locals to see the world in terms of mutually exclusive
national communities, they quickly came up against economic, social, and cultural realities
that promoted a different approach, however. In a period of increasing geographic and social
mobility, many people recognized bilingualism, for example, as an effective tool for obtaining
social advancement. Parents had long argued that education in two regional languages, for
example, would give their children more tools to obtain better employment. “Our children
learn Carniolan at home” complained Slovene-speaking parents to the authorities already in
the 1820s; “They should be learning German in the school.”9 As state-funded primary
education was offered in the recognized regional vernacular languages (in principle as early
as the education reforms of Maria Theresa in the 1770s but more practically with the
education reforms of 1868), knowledge of a second language, be it Magyar in Hungary,
Polish in Galicia, Italian in Trieste, or German in Cisleithania, opened greater possibilities
for higher education or a career in government service to the individual. Increasingly in the
late nineteenth century, however, nationalist activists fought bilingualism and bilingual
education, seeing the phenomenon as a potential danger to the national community.
Especially in a society where nationhood was deﬁned almost completely on the basis of
language use, bilingualism, it was claimed, could potentially weaken individual commitment
to the nation (and especially in a young child). Many local people, however, including those
who otherwise identiﬁed themselves with a national community, continued to demand a
bilingual education for their children. Their unwillingness to commit their children to single
language education became increasingly stigmatized as alleged indifference to their nation.10
The challenge of bilingualism was hardly necessary, however, to produce indifference to
nationhood. Bilingualism simply constituted one factor that tended to exacerbate public
discussion of the issue among nationalists and thus facilitated historians’ investigations. It
was, as Tara Zahra and others have convincingly demonstrated, a general popular
unwillingness to commit oneself fully to a nationalist program that drove nationalists to
adopt more extreme positions, and this unwillingness could just as easily manifest itself in
linguistically homogenous regions. Thus, the picture of radical nationalist conﬂict in late
Habsburg Austria especially (but also in Hungary) with which we are familiar may not be
the product of emerging nations battling each other or the state, so much as a conﬂict that
pitted nationalists of all kinds against those whom they perceived as dangerously indifferent
to nationhood. This perception is reinforced by another element that several scholars—
including those at Edmonton—have repeatedly noted about nationalists activists, namely, the
close similarities of their appeals and their organizational structures to each other. Rival
nationalist organizations did not develop separately from one another; instead, they shared
strategies, ideological appeals, and organizational structures. They were ultimately far more
similar to each other than to the nationally indifferent whom they failed to mobilize
adequately. And many of the conﬂicts between nationalist elites were actually conﬂicts over
which nation a contested individual “really” belonged to, something nationalists increasingly
asserted could be determined based on “objective” characteristics.11
9Hösler, Von Krain zu Slowenien, 142.
10Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands 1900–1948
(Ithaca, 2008), 13–48; on the decline of bilingual schooling in Slovene-German language regions, see Maria Kurz, “Der
Volksschulstreit in der Südsteiermark und in Kärnten in der Zeit der Dezemberverfassung” (PhD diss., University of
Vienna, 1986); Judson, Guardians, 47–48.
11On the fundamental similarity among the various nationalist movements in Cisleithania, Judson,Guardians, 16–7. For
the rise of nationalist arguments that national identity could be determined according to objective criteria, see Gerald
Stourzh, “Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria: Good Intentions, Evil Consequences,” in The Habsburg Legacy:
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Once nation-states replaced Austria-Hungary after 1918 and nationalists gained considerable
inﬂuence within state governments, they increased their intrusive demands on people’s behavior
by exponential proportions. Using the power of the law to shape popular behavior and to mold
more nationalist citizens, they provoked many people to develop new strategies either to avoid
national commitment or to attempt to use it opportunistically in situations of social conﬂict.
During World War II, of course, national indifference was seen as an act of collaboration or
treason, particularly when East Europeans invoked their ties to Germandom in order to join
the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft.12
These battles continued well into postwar Eastern Europe. After 1945, for example, conﬂicts
raged in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia over how to determine which nationally
ambiguous citizens should be expelled to Germany and which could be proﬁtably “salvaged”
for the nation. Ofﬁcial citizenship laws did not necessarily determine how these conﬂicts
worked out on the ground. So-called intermarried couples and their children were
particularly troublesome to nationalists.13 Even after 1948, diplomatic conﬂicts erupted when
the Polish government refused to acknowledge the French nationality of Poles who were
naturalized French citizens or of French women married to Poles and forcibly detained them
behind the Iron Curtain. In the twentieth century, national indifference increasingly brought
the risk of deportation, detention, or death.14
The participants at the Edmonton symposium did not simply believe that some other forms
of identity might more usefully be substituted for national identity, such as regional, religious,
patriotic, or local. Most developed an approach that allowed them to see beyond a static element
of identity, or indeed multiple or even ﬂuid identities. Their focus on context propelled them
toward a more situational understanding of people’s self-identiﬁcation. Following the recent
work of Rogers Brubaker, many of these scholars analyzed situations in which national
feeling or national commitment had come into play, as opposed to situations that had
engaged other feelings or loyalties in individuals.15 Most interestingly, several of them
demonstrate the ways in which concepts like dynastic patriotism and nationalist
commitment, often understood as opposing forces, were in fact mutually constitutive of each
for many people. Thus, indifference to nation or nationalism does not necessarily involve
National Identity in Historical Perspective, ed. Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms, 67–83 (Austrian Studies, vol. 5)
(Edinburgh, 1994); on the rise of objective attribution and the attempts of individuals to ﬁght this trend, see Tara
Zahra, Kidnapped Souls, 39–48 and 106–41.
12On interwar Europe and World War II, see Zahra, Kidnapped Souls; Chad Bryant, Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and
Czech Nationalism (Cambridge, 2009); Timothy Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania,
Belarus, 1569–1999 (New Haven, CT, 2004); Brown, Biography of No Place; Nancy M. Wingﬁeld, Flag Wars and
Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech (Cambridge, 2007); Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How
the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York, 2009); Elizabeth Harvey, Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of
Germanization (New Haven, CT, 2003); Doris Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of ‘Volksdeutsche’ and the Exacerbation
of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939–45,” Journal of Contemporary History 29, no. 4 (October 1994): 569–82.
13Benjamin Frommer, “Expulsion or Integration: Unmixing Interethnic Marriage in Postwar Czechoslovakia,” East
European Politics and Societies 23, no. 2 (2009): 185–212; Tara Zahra, The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe’s
Families after World War II (Cambridge, 2011), chap. 6; Gregor Thum, Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wroclaw
During the Century of Expulsions (Princeton, 2011). On conﬂicts over national classiﬁcation in Germany’s postwar
Displaced Persons’ Camps, see G. Daniel Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order
(Oxford, 2011), chap. 2; Zahra, The Lost Children, chap. 4 and 7; Pamela Ballinger’s essay in this issue of the Austrian
History Yearbook.
14See ﬁles in folders 204–205, Pologne, 1944–1970, Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, Paris.
15Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, 2004), 7–27; see also Rogers Brubaker and Fred Cooper,
“Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (February 2000): 1–47.
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outright rejection of the nation as a form of identiﬁcation. Rather, indifference refers to the
attempt to maintain a degree of choice in one’s life, in historical situations where such
choices are becoming drastically limited, either by ofﬁcial ﬁat or local activist pressure.
“Indifference” ultimately constituted a form of agency for citizens in a world of competing
nationalist movements and nationalizing states. If its meaning changed across time and
space, its specter haunted and frustrated nationalists continuously, reminding them of the
limits of their own power to mold the world in their image.
PIETER M. JUDSON is Isaac H. Clothier professor of history and international relations at Swarthmore
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TARA ZAHRA is associate professor of history at the University of Chicago. The authors would like to thank
Franz A. J. Szabo, Gary B. Cohen, and Peter Haslinger for their roles in organizing the 2008 symposium
“Sites of Indifference to Nation in Habsburg Central Europe” held at the Wirth Institute for Austrian and
Central European Studies at the University of Alberta in Edmonton.
INTRODUCTION 27
